

Costs and Spillover Effects of Private Insurers' Coverage of Hepatitis C Treatment

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Hepatitis C virus (HCV) infection is a slowly progressing disease that often remains asymptomatic for at least 10 years post exposure. Left untreated, HCV infection can lead to serious hepatic complications, liver failure, and death.^{1,5} Through recent pharmaceutical breakthroughs, short courses of treatment with direct-acting antivirals (DAAs) provide a high likelihood of cure.^{6,7} DAAs are the current standard of care in the United States, but they generate higher upfront costs relative to previous treatments.

The higher cost and efficacy of DAAs present a quandary for health system decision makers: treatment costs are borne in the short term, yet a significant portion of the benefits, including reduced disease transmission and HCV-related costs, accrue over the longer term. Few doubt that patients with HCV should be treated with these highly effective novel therapies; the salient policy question is when treatment should occur. A growing body of research indicates that early HCV treatment likely generates the greatest value for patients and society⁷; however, it is much less clear that early treatment generates benefits for the private payers providing this treatment to patients with HCV. Private payers retain enrollees less than 10 years on average,⁸ which discourages investments in therapies with long-term benefits. These incentives may conflict with the value other payers receive when they enroll patients who were treated earlier in their disease state, before complications arose.⁷

The misalignment between short-term costs and long-term benefits is of particular concern for Medicare, which insures individuals 65 or older.⁹ An estimated 75% of individuals currently infected with HCV in the United States are baby boomers (born between 1945 and 1965)—most of whom will be enrolled in Medicare within the next 10 to 15 years.¹⁰ Further, the majority of HCV-positive baby boomers was likely infected decades ago, and therefore, is at serious risk of disease complications when entering Medicare.¹¹

Because private insurers currently cover a large population of HCV-positive baby boomers, their HCV coverage

ABSTRACT

Objectives: Hepatitis C virus (HCV) treatment incentives for private payers may be misaligned because payers must bear immediate costs and may not realize long-term benefits. However, these benefits may accrue to future payers, including Medicare. We examined how and to what extent private payers' current HCV treatment coverage decisions impact Medicare's and private payers' future costs.

Study Design: Discrete-time Markov model.

Methods: We modelled HCV disease progression and transmission to simulate the economic and social effects of different private-payer HCV treatment scenarios on Medicare. The model examined differences between a baseline scenario (current practice guidelines) and 2 alternative scenarios that expand treatment coverage. Spillover effects were measured as reduced HCV treatment costs and medical expenditures in Medicare. We calculated the spillover effects and net social value of each scenario (total value of quality-adjusted life-years accrued over time minus cumulative treatment and medical costs).

Results: With expanded HCV treatment coverage, private payers experience reduced medical expenditures in the 3-to-5-year time horizon; however, they still face higher treatment costs. Over a 20-year horizon, private payers experience overall savings of \$10 billion to \$14 billion after treatment costs. The expansion of coverage by private payers generates positive spillover benefits to Medicare of \$0.3 billion to \$0.7 billion over a 5-year horizon, and \$4 billion to \$11 billion over a 20-year horizon.

Conclusions: When private payers increase HCV treatment coverage, they may achieve significant savings while inducing spillover benefits to Medicare. Future savings, however, may not motivate immediate treatment investments among private payers who experience high beneficiary turnover.

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decisions today will impact their own costs, as well as the long-term costs borne by the publicly funded Medicare system.¹² In this article, we simulate the transmission and progression of HCV under various private-payer HCV treatment coverage policies, quantify how these policies affect health-care costs and benefits borne by private insurers and Medicare, and compute the social impact of these policies.

Take-Away Points

Although the treatment costs for hepatitis C virus (HCV) are borne immediately, many benefits of treatment (eg, improved quality of life, longer survival) accrue in the future. Private payers with high beneficiary turnover may be reluctant to cover HCV treatment today, but foregoing treatment today results in larger future healthcare costs for both Medicare and private payers.

- Expanding private coverage of HCV treatments would generate \$10 billion to \$14 billion in private-payer savings and \$4 billion to \$11 billion in spillover benefits to Medicare after 20 years.
- Costs of private-coverage expansion exceed benefits for private payers in the short term; however, this investment would break even after 16 to 17 years.
- Total social value of comprehensive HCV treatment is positive for society, but private insurers do not have the incentive to provide comprehensive HCV treatment.

METHODS

Overview of the Markov Model of HCV Transmission and Disease Progression

We developed a discrete-time Markov model (Microsoft Excel 2010/VBA, Microsoft Corporation, Redmond, Washington) that incorporates patient insurance status, categorized as Medicare, Medicaid, private, or uninsured. We quantified the downstream indirect effects on Medicare from earlier private-insurer investment in HCV treatment, which we refer to as “spillover effects”^{13,14} (see **Figure 1**; a detailed description of the model is available in the **eAppendix** [available at www.ajmc.com]).

The model categorizes patients into 3 subpopulations by risk of HCV exposure: 1) people who inject drugs (PWID); 2) HIV-infected men who have sex with men (MSM-HIV); and 3) all other adults born before 1992, when systematic testing of the blood supply for HCV began (“Other Adults”), of which baby boomers account for approximately 39%.¹⁵ The model assumes that individuals belong to the same risk group throughout the simulation. The risk groups of infected patients are further stratified by HCV genotypes 1, 2, and 3, which account for 70%, 16%, and 12% of the HCV-infected populations in the United States, respectively.¹⁶

The model assumes Other Adults is a closed cohort in which infected individuals do not transmit HCV to uninfected individuals.¹⁷⁻¹⁹ This assumption is based on the introduction of mandatory HCV screening of blood products in 1992 and the observed low disease-transmission risk among adults who are not PWID or MSM-HIV.^{17,20} HCV can be transmitted by an infected individual in the PWID or MSM-HIV groups to an uninfected individual in the same group; uninfected individuals and those previously cured of HCV are at risk of becoming infected. Furthermore, patients can only be infected with 1 genotype at a time, but can become re-infected with any genotype after being cured.


Once infected with HCV, patients progress through disease states based on transition probabilities obtained

from the literature (see eAppendix). The initial distribution of fibrosis stages is assumed independent of age and insurance status.²¹ We use the METAVIR scoring system to categorize liver fibrosis stages from F0 (no fibrosis) to F4 (most severe). Successfully treated patients return to the pool of susceptible individuals and have the same reinfection probability as individuals who were never infected.

Patients are eligible for treatment if they meet the treatment coverage criteria specified by their insurance type. For the PWID and Other Adults groups, we computed the population’s initial insurance distribution and HCV prevalence by age, using the 5 most recent waves of the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES) (2003-2004 through 2011-2012), applying appropriate weights to generate nationally representative estimates.^{15,22} Due to the small sample of NHANES respondents in the MSM-HIV exposure group, we used prevalence estimates from the published literature.^{16,23,24} For all groups, insurance type was assumed constant throughout the simulation, except when patients entered Medicare at age 65. Only diagnosed patients may receive treatment, and based on published estimates of diagnosis rates, we assumed 50% of patients infected with HCV were diagnosed during any given model cycle.²⁵

HCV treatment costs, medical expenditures (nontreatment medical costs), quality-adjusted life-year (QALY) weights, and mortality rates were derived from estimates in the published literature.^{26,27} All cost parameters were inflated to 2015 US dollars, and future costs and QALYs were discounted at an annual 3% rate.²⁸ Treatment costs vary by genotype and fibrosis stage, while medical expenditures and QALY weights vary by disease state. Treatment efficacy, treatment costs, and medical expenditures do not vary by insurance status or over time, with the exception of treatment costs, which are discounted after 2 years to account for future market competition²⁹ (see eAppendix for full details).

■ **Figure 1.** Schematic of HCV Transmission and Progression Model^{a,b}



DC indicates decompensated cirrhosis; F0-F4, fibrosis stages of HCV, F4 being most severe; HCC, hepatocellular carcinoma; HCV, hepatitis C virus; trans, transplant.

^aThis schematic represents a single 1-year cycle in the simulation of the HCV model developed in this paper. The model is simulated repeatedly over a given time period, and population outcomes are recorded after each cycle. At the start of the model, individuals are classified by HCV disease state: susceptible (uninfected), infected with acute HCV, or infected with chronic HCV. Chronically infected patients are distributed across fibrosis stages F0-F4, DC, or HCC. In each model cycle, patients can transition across disease states and chronically infected patients can initiate treatment. Patients who receive treatment and are cured return to the susceptible pool of individuals. All states have transitions to "dead." (See the eAppendix for full details about model states and transitions.)

^bAdapted from the appendix of Van Nuys (2015)⁷ and reproduced by permission of the authors.

Treatment Scenarios

We simulated 3 treatment coverage scenarios over a 20-year period: a baseline scenario and 2 alternative scenarios with varying degrees of expanded treatment coverage. All scenarios assume that patients with Medicare, Medicaid, or private insurance coverage who meet the fibrosis stage criteria are treated with DAAs, while uninsured patients have no access to treatment.³⁰⁻³²

In the baseline scenario, we assumed all diagnosed publicly and privately insured patients infected with HCV in fibrosis stages F3 or F4 would receive treatment, following the American Association for the Study of Liver Diseases and Infectious Diseases Society of America guidelines for "highest priority for treatment," which is consistent with general trends regarding payer coverage of HCV treatment.^{30,33-36} The alternative scenarios assumed that private insurers expand treatment coverage to either fibrosis stages F2-F4 or F0-F4.

Baseline Distribution of Insurance Status

Table 1 presents the baseline distribution of insurance status by risk group. Although more than 40% of the PWID and MSM-HIV groups are uninsured or covered by Medicaid, the majority (53%) of the Other Adults group has private insurance coverage. Even though treatment scenarios assume uninsured patients do not receive treatment, these patients may benefit from expanded private insurance treatment coverage through lower HCV transmission rates since fewer patients will transmit the disease after treatment.

Alternative Simulations

In addition to the treatment scenarios described above, we conducted 3 additional simulations. First, we assessed the spillover effects to Medicare solely driven by individuals transitioning into Medicare at age 65, by measuring Medicare spillovers for the Other Adults risk group only,

■ **Table 1. Baseline Distribution of Insurance Status by Risk Group**

Payer Type	Percent of Risk Group (%)		
	Other Adult ^a	PWID	MSM-HIV
Private	53.3	40.4	42.9
Medicare	19.8	7.5	16.8
Medicaid ^b	8.2	13.0	25.6
Uninsured	18.7	39.1	14.7

MSM-HIV indicates men infected with HIV who have sex with men; PWID, people who inject drugs.
^a“Other Adult” indicates all other adults born prior to 1992.
^bThe Medicaid payer type includes Medicaid and other state and local programs.
 Source: National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey, 2003-2012.

which has no disease transmission in the model. Second, we calculated the impact of Medicare treatment coverage expansion on Medicare costs and computed spillover effects to private insurers, while holding constant private treatment coverage at the baseline. Finally, we explored the impact on Medicare if Medicaid expands treatment coverage simultaneously with private insurers.

Model Outputs

Across all scenarios, the spillover effects on Medicare are computed as the change in HCV cost burden resulting from private payers expanding HCV treatment coverage minus the change in annual total healthcare expenditures (ie, medical and HCV treatment costs), relative to the baseline scenario. This captures the net benefit from the payer perspective.

To capture the impact from patients’ perspectives, we computed the change in net social value of HCV treatment

relative to the baseline scenario. We define net social value as the total value of QALYs accrued over time (ie, value of health gains from treatment) minus cumulative treatment and medical costs. We assumed a \$150,000 value per QALY, given the range of values cited in the literature.^{37,38} We focused on outcomes for 5- and 20-year horizons, but results for 10 years are presented in the eAppendix.

RESULTS

Effects of Private Insurance Treatment Expansion

Table 2 shows the impact on private payers and on Medicare 5 and 20 years after private payers expand treatment from the baseline (F3-F4) to either F2-F4 or F0-F4. When treatment is expanded to F2-F4, private payers, as a class, realize net savings from reduced medical expenditures within 20 years. Relative to the baseline scenario, Medicare’s cumulative costs are reduced by \$0.25 billion (\$74 per HCV-positive Medicare beneficiary) after 5 years and \$4.4 billion (\$427 per HCV-positive Medicare beneficiary) after 20 years. These cost reductions represent the spillover effect on Medicare from private payers’ treatment expansion even though Medicare does not expand coverage. In other words, if private payers restrict treatment coverage to F3-F4, Medicare would face an additional \$4.4 billion cost burden over 20 years, relative to F2-F4 treatment coverage.

Medicare receives a larger net benefit if private treatment coverage is expanded to F0-F4. After 20 years, Medicare’s medical expenditures declined by \$9 billion and treatment costs declined by \$2 billion, for a net benefit of \$11 billion


■ **Table 2. Change in Costs^a When Private Insurers Expand Treatment Coverage**

	Treat F2-F4		Treat F0-F4	
	Cost Effect on Private Insurers	Cost Effect on Medicare “Spillovers”	Cost Effect on Private Insurers	Cost Effect on Medicare “Spillovers”
5-year horizon				
Change in medical expenditures (\$B)	-\$6.81	-\$0.20	-\$21.82	-\$0.67
Change in HCV treatment costs (\$B)	\$32.28	-\$0.04	\$100.03	-\$0.05
Change in total costs (\$B)	\$25.47	-\$0.25	\$78.21	-\$0.72
Change in total costs per capita	\$7641	-\$74	\$23,646	-\$217
20-year horizon				
Change in medical expenditures (\$B)	-\$44.33	-\$3.00	-\$104.43	-\$9.03
Change in HCV treatment costs (\$B)	\$34.00	-\$1.40	\$90.15	-\$2.03
Change in total costs (\$B)	-\$10.33	-\$4.40	-\$14.28	-\$11.06
Change in total costs per capita	-\$1002	-\$427	-\$1465	-\$1134

\$B indicates US dollars in billions; F0-F4, fibrosis stages of HCV (F4 being most severe); HCV, hepatitis C virus.

^aCosts are changes that result from expanding from the baseline scenario (treat F3-F4) and are reported in 2015 US dollars. Future costs are discounted at a rate of 3% per year. Per capita costs are calculated as total cost per HCV-positive Medicare beneficiary at the given time horizon.

■ **Figure 2.** Cumulative Net Benefits to Payers^a From Private Treatment Expansion Relative to Treat F3-F4



\$B indicates US dollars in billions; F0-F4, fibrosis stages of HCV (F4 being most severe).

^aNet benefits to payer = medical expenditure savings – treatment costs.

(\$1134 per HCV-positive Medicare beneficiary). In both alternative scenarios, private payers with time horizons of less than 20 years have the incentive to restrict treatment coverage, even though this policy harms both Medicare and private insurers in the long term. **Figure 2** makes clear, however, that private payers do not enjoy the same net benefit as Medicare in the short term, because they bear the upfront treatment costs. Private payers face increased total costs of \$25 billion to \$78 billion after 5 years of expanding treatment. It takes roughly 16 to 17 years for private payers to break even on their upfront investment in treatment; after 20 years, they enjoy net savings of \$10 billion to \$14 billion. When treatment is expanded to F0-F4, net benefits to Medicare are 2.5 times higher compared with expanding to F2-F4. In addition, despite 5-year costs that are almost 3 times larger compared to expansion to F2-F4, expanding to F0-F4 results in an additional \$4 billion in savings to private payers over a 20-year period.

Expanding HCV treatment coverage also greatly benefits society, through both reduced mortality and improved

health-related quality of life for treated patients.³⁹ Relative to treating at stages F3-F4, expanding treatment to F2-F4 generates 0.9 million additional discounted life-years over a 20-year period, and this figure increases to 1.17 million discounted QALYs after applying health utilities to the model population. Similarly, expansion to F0-F4 generates 1.7 million discounted life-years and 2.35 million QALYs over 20 years, relative to treating F3-F4.

QALY gains represent considerable value for society (see **Figure 3**). The cumulative net social value for each treatment expansion scenario is positive within 8 years. However, expanding treatment to F0-F4 provides the largest societal benefits after 20 years, at \$382 billion, compared with only \$192 billion generated by only expanding to F2-F4.


Alternative Simulation Results

In the simulation of the private-payer treatment expansion for the Other Adults group only, we assessed the Medicare spillovers driven solely by individuals transitioning into Medicare at age 65. We found that the Other Adults group accounts for 88% of the 20-year spillover effect when treatment is expanded to F2-F4 and 84% when treatment is expanded to F0-F4. This suggests that the majority of the net benefits to Medicare result from improved health of currently infected patients rather than reduced transmission.

Next, we assessed the impact on private payers' costs, attributable to Medicare expanding treatment coverage from F3-F4 to F2-F4, holding private-insurer treatment coverage constant at the baseline. In this simulation, because individuals do not transition from Medicare to private insurance, private insurers benefit from reduced treatment costs and medical expenditures exclusively due to a reduced transmission effect. Therefore, the spillovers generated by expanded Medicare treatment coverage are smaller than those generated by expanded private insurance treatment. After 20 years, private insurers experience cost savings of \$0.97 billion compared with the \$4.4 billion Medicare saves in the analogous private expansion scenario. Additionally, Medicare requires 25 years to reach positive net benefits of expanding treatment coverage to F2-F4.

Finally, we explored the impact of expanding Medicaid treatment coverage simultaneously with private insurance coverage. If both Medicaid and private payers expand treatment from F3-F4 to F2-F4, Medicare saves \$5.1 billion over 20 years—an additional \$0.6 billion in savings, relative to a private-payer expansion alone. Simultaneous expansion by Medicaid and private insurers from F3-F4 to F0-F4 saves Medicare \$12.8 billion in total costs—an additional \$1.2 billion in savings. Given the significantly larger size of the

Figure 3. Social Value^{a,b} of More Generous Hepatitis C Virus Treatment by Private Insurers Relative to Treat F3-F4



\$B indicates US dollars in billions; F0-F4, fibrosis stages of HCV (F4 being most severe); QALY, quality-adjusted life-year.
^aValues calculated for all insurance types combined.
^bNet social value = (QALYs x \$150,000) – medical expenditures – treatment costs.

privately insured population relative to the Medicaid population, it is not surprising that private insurance treatment expansion generates the majority of spillovers to Medicare.

Expanding Medicaid treatment coverage also has a small effect on costs to private payers through reduced transmission rates. Over 20 years, private payers experience an additional \$0.3 billion in total cost savings when Medicaid expands treatment to F2-F4 and an additional \$0.82 billion in total cost savings when Medicaid expands treatment to F0-F4.

The eAppendix presents additional sensitivity analyses conducted on model parameters and assumptions; specifically, sensitivities to changes in treatment costs and in the value of a QALY. Our findings suggest that increasing treatment costs by 50% does not substantively change spillovers to Medicare.⁶ For example, when treatment costs increase by 50%, expanding treatment to F2-F4 re-

sults in a \$5.1-billion savings to Medicare compared with a \$4.4-billion savings in the main analysis. We also found that reducing the value of a QALY to \$50,000 yields a positive net social value by year 10 compared with year 8 in the main analysis.

DISCUSSION

Investments in HCV treatment pay off over the long term; unfortunately, however, private payers face patient turnover, which makes it difficult for them to enjoy the long-term return on their investment. Although most enrollees switch insurers within 10 years, it takes roughly 15 years for private-payer treatment investments to pay off, from their own individual perspective. Therefore, enrollee turnover creates a short-term focus among private payers that might discourage HCV treatment and other similar long-term investments. The costs of this incentive problem are borne by all future payers—including Medicare and private payers.

The vast majority of HCV-positive baby boomers will transition from private insurance coverage to Medicare within the next decade. Our analysis shows that when private payers expand treatment coverage to fibrosis stages F2-F4, they accrue cost savings over the next 20 years and save Medicare \$4.4 billion over the same period. However, if private insurers expand coverage to all fibrosis stages (F0-F4), the spillover benefits to Medicare increase to \$11.1 billion over 20 years.

Future costs are also borne by private payers. This may seem counterintuitive since these costs result from private payers' own decisions; however, this is a classic economic problem of "free-riding." Private payers recognize that other firms today cover the enrollees they will cover in 15 years; thus, they understand that their current treatment decisions have a smaller impact on the health of their enrollee population 15 years from now. Consequently, a single insurer can only hope that other payers will treat its future beneficiaries. Unfortunately, all private payers face the same harsh calculus, which discourages short-term treatment investments and imposes long-term costs on everyone.

This study adds to the growing evidence that earlier HCV treatment generates considerable value to patients and society, contributing to the ongoing debate about when to initiate HCV treatment, given its costs. Although treatment guidelines do not recommend limiting treatment by fibrosis stage, insurers must balance the increasing evidence for early treatment against their actuarial costs.³⁰ Additionally, this study demonstrates the magnitude of the wedge between payer incentives today,

and when patients infected with HCV age into Medicare in the future. Decision makers charged with allocating limited healthcare resources are faced with difficult tradeoffs between short-term costs and long-term benefits. Although this issue is salient in the treatment of HCV, it applies to numerous other clinical settings as well.

Our results present a challenge to policy makers regarding who should be responsible for HCV treatment coverage decisions. Although the socially optimal strategy is for private insurers to expand treatment coverage, this conflicts with their short-term financial incentives. A blunt solution would subsidize HCV treatments directly, since their long-term social benefits exceed the benefits internalized by private payers.

A more nuanced solution would allow private payers to capture the long-term benefits they create from expanded treatment, even if patients switch coverage. An insurer who treats a patient lowers the actuarial cost of covering that patient in the future, which could be rebated to the original insurer as a “handoff payment” if the patient were to switch coverage.⁴⁰ Alternatively, an explicit credit could be granted to each payer that treats a patient.⁴¹ An example is the idea of “Healthcoins,” or a similar market-based tradable asset pegged at the value society derives from treatment (benefits of treatment minus costs).⁴¹ These and other policy options remain an open area of further research and discussion.

Limitations

As in any modeling-based analysis, our approach has some limitations. Markov models are designed to capture cohort-level effects and therefore cannot forecast individual disease processes and outcomes.^{42,43} We assumed individuals belong to a single risk group to avoid double counting, but some overlap is likely to exist in reality. We also assumed no retreatment for individuals who initially failed treatment, but this limitation likely results in a small impact on cost estimates, since existing research indicates that the number of nonresponders is low.^{6,44,46}

Although NHANES provides reliable population-level estimates, subpopulation estimates are less reliable due to small sample sizes. Additionally, due to NHANES’ self-reporting design, it is possible that stigmatized behaviors, such as sexual activities and intravenous drug use, are underreported, which would affect subpopulation estimates. However, NHANES-based estimates are similar to other estimates reported in the literature.⁴⁷ Finally, NHANES also does not capture homeless and incarcerated populations, both of which have high HCV prevalence and limited treatment access.^{15,48}

Lastly, our model was designed to examine spillover effects of private coverage policies to Medicare; thus, transitions between insurance types are not modeled, except for individuals aging into Medicare at 65. Spillovers to Medicaid and uninsured populations are limited in our model to the impact of reduced disease transmission. Incorporating insurance transitions could generate additional positive spillover effects from healthier individuals switching among Medicaid, private plans, and uninsured. Additionally, our model assumes uniform coverage among private insurers and does not capture variation in insurance coverage levels. We did not, therefore, study the effects of private insurers who offer different levels of coverage. Differences in coverage may be relevant in a competitive private market or one in which employers and beneficiaries vary in their demand for benefit generosity. Differences in benefit design and competition among insurers present valuable questions for further research.

CONCLUSIONS

Expanding HCV treatment coverage significantly benefits patients and society through a reduced disease burden; however, the optimal approach to paying for these treatments is less clear. As our results demonstrate, expanding private insurance coverage of HCV treatments reduces treatment costs and medical expenditures for Medicare over all time horizons. It also generates net savings for private insurers in the longer term and benefits to society in terms of QALYs. The misalignment between short-term treatment costs and long-term benefits that private payers face, however, may not promote socially optimal treatment strategies. Public policies may be required to realize the benefits of expanding HCV treatment coverage.

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eAppendix. Investing in the Future: Costs and Spillover Effects of Private Insurers’ Coverage of Hepatitis C Treatment

1. Conceptual Model

Hepatitis C (HCV) is a transmissible viral infection that is often asymptomatic in the early stages of the disease, but can progress to serious liver complications, including cirrhosis and hepatocellular carcinoma, over years or decades and lead to a significant healthcare and cost burden.¹⁻³ Approximately half of HCV-infected patients are unaware they have the disease, which complicates treatment of the virus.⁴⁻⁶

1.1. Model States

We developed a discrete time Markov model in Excel to simulate HCV progression and treatment as depicted in the schematic in the **Figure**,⁷ which represents a single 1-year cycle in the simulation of the HCV model developed in this paper. The model is simulated repeatedly (eg, each year for 20 years), and population outcomes, such as the number of people in each disease state, are collected at the end of each cycle. In each cycle over which the model is simulated, the population transitions through each disease state at assumed probabilities.

The model includes states in which the population is not infected (ie, “susceptible”) or cured and states in which the population is infected. We define the infection disease states as acute or chronic, where chronic consists of 7 stages of liver damage: fibrosis stages F0-F4 using the METAVIR scoring system, decompensated cirrhosis (DC), and hepatocellular carcinoma (HCC). **Table A1** summarizes the METAVIR scoring system, which quantifies the degree of liver fibrosis in patients with liver diseases such as HCV.⁸

Table A1. METAVIR Stage Descriptions⁸

Stage	Description
0	No fibrosis
1	Periportal fibrotic expansion
2	Periportal septae (septum)
3	Porto-central septae
4	Compensated cirrhosis

1.2. Populations Modeled

We model 3 cohorts or subpopulations, defined by their level of risk of HCV exposure: (a) people who inject drugs (PWID), (b) men infected with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) who have sex with men (MSM-HIV), and (c) adults who were born prior to 1992 when systematic testing of the blood supply for HCV began (Other Adults). The PWID group includes individuals who self-identify as using intravenous drugs. The MSM-HIV group includes individuals who self-identify as MSM and have tested positive for HIV. The Other Adult group

includes all other adults born before 1992 who do not report being in the PWID or MSM-HIV group.⁹ In the manuscript we refer to these 3 cohorts as “risk groups.”

The 3 risk groups are modeled independently—an individual belongs to 1 risk group for the duration of the simulation, and risk groups do not interact. Outside of the PWID and MSM-HIV groups, the risk of HCV transmission is low,¹⁰⁻¹³ and we therefore make the simplifying assumption of no ongoing transmission in the Other Adult risk group. Because it is a closed cohort, the Other Adult population shrinks over time.¹⁴ We assume that the PWID and MSM-HIV risk groups experience ongoing entry and exit such that their cohort size remains constant over the simulation. Mortality rates for the risk groups are discussed in more detail in section 3.2.

Within each risk group, we model the 3 HCV genotypes most common in the United States (genotypes 1, 2 and 3).¹⁵ This permits us to model HCV prevalence and transmission with greater nuance, and to account for the fact that different genotypes respond differently to treatment,¹⁶ may progress at different rates,^{17,18} and face different mortality risks.¹⁹ Patients can only be infected with 1 genotype at a time, but once cured, a patient can be re-infected with any of the 3 genotypes.

In order to track insurance status in the simulation, we further stratify the population in each risk group into 4 insurance status categories and 1-year age cohorts. The 4 insurance status categories are private, Medicare, Medicaid, and uninsured. We assume that insurance status does not depend on disease state and does not change over time, except when the population transitions into Medicare at age 65 years. In other words, the proportion of the population who turns 65 during the simulation switches insurance status from private, Medicaid, or uninsured to Medicare. The population that is under age 65 years during the entire simulation retains its initial insurance status.

1.3. Model Transitions

In each disease state, there are a number of possible transitions, which are represented by arrows in the schematic in **Figure 1**. The model assumes that transition to death is possible from all states, but to simplify the schematic, Figure 1 suppresses arrows representing the transition to death. The probability of transition along these arrows is assumed, based on the literature, or calculated.

Upon initial infection, patients enter an “acute” phase, which they must leave after 1 model cycle. They may die, spontaneously clear the disease without treatment, or progress to “chronic” disease. The model assumes that 13% of acute infections for MSM-HIV and 18% of acute infections for PWID and Other Adults clear spontaneously.^{20,21} Patients may stay in any disease state, except acute, for more than 1 cycle.

Patients in stage F0 or higher may receive HCV treatment during the simulation, depending on the treatment scenario; if not cured, treated patients may progress or die at the same rates as infected and untreated patients. If HCV is cured in stages F0-F2, patients are no longer infectious, and the model assumes that liver damage is reversed.^{22,23} These patients return to the susceptible population with healthy livers; if re-infected, they re-commence disease progression at the acute stage.

Patients cured of HCV in stages F3 and higher are no longer infectious, but they still may progress to additional liver damage, albeit more slowly than patients with uncured HCV.²⁴ They

are susceptible to re-infection at the same rate as patients without liver damage, but if re-infected, re-enter the infected population with their existing level of liver damage. Patients with DC or HCC who are cured of HCV are no longer infectious and become eligible for liver transplants. The transplant stage lasts exactly 1 cycle, after which patients move to a posttransplant state. If these patients are re-infected, they re-enter the infected population with healthy livers at the acute stage. Consistent with current clinical practice, patients who are co-infected with HIV (all patients in the MSM-HIV risk group; see below) are not eligible for liver transplants.^{25,26}

1.4. Transmission Function

In the PWID and MSM-HIV risk groups, for each genotype, the rate at which individuals are infected is modeled dynamically as a function of the number in the risk group who are currently infected with the given genotype. Individuals who are uninfected (susceptible) at the beginning of a year t are at risk of becoming HCV-infected, and the probability of becoming infected during year t (ie, the annual incidence rate) is given by:

$$Pr(\text{infected}_{t+1}|\text{susceptible}_t) = K \times \frac{N_t^{\text{infected}}}{N_t^{\text{infected}} + N_t^{\text{susceptible}}} \quad (1)$$

where t is the year, N_t^{infected} is the number of people infected at the beginning of year t , and $N_t^{\text{susceptible}}$ is the number of people susceptible at the beginning of year t . The transmission model specified by equation (1) assumes that the incidence rate is proportional to the fraction of individuals in a risk group who are infected. The proportionality constant K is calibrated to ensure that the incidence rate (the left side of equation 1) matches the empirical estimate of disease incidence rate at model start ($t = 0$):

$$K = \frac{(\text{incidence rate}_{t_0})(N_{t_0}^{\text{infected}} + N_{t_0}^{\text{susceptible}})}{N_{t_0}^{\text{infected}}} \quad (2)$$

The incidence rates and proportionality constants K for each risk group by genotype are reported in **Table A2**. We assume K only varies across risk groups and is the same for each genotype within a risk group. This model assumes a constant ratio between incidence [left-hand side of equation (1)] and prevalence [the ratio on the right-hand side of equation (1)]—that is, that risk of infection is proportional to prevalence. This implicitly assumes that within a risk group, newly infected people do not change their behaviors and are equally likely to transmit the disease as previously infected people, even though previously infected people may be more likely to be higher risk.

Table A2. Starting Annual Incidence Rates and Values of K

	Annual Incidence Rate	Calculated K
Other Adult^a		
Genotype 1	0	0
Genotype 2	0	0
Genotype 3	0	0
PWID		
Genotype 1	0.0065	0.025
Genotype 2	0.0014	0.025
Genotype 3	0.0011	0.025
MSM-HIV		
Genotype 1	0.0034	0.021
Genotype 2	0.0007	0.021
Genotype 3	0.0006	0.021

K is the proportionality constant for incidence rate; HIV, human immunodeficiency virus; MSM-HIV, HIV-positive men who have sex with men; PWID, people who inject drugs.

^aOther Adults, US residents born before 1992 who are not members of the PWID or MSM-HIV groups
Source: Williams et al (2011)¹¹ and authors' calculations.

2. Analysis of Policy Scenarios

All scenarios assume that HCV treatment consists of the most effective direct-acting antiviral (DAA) regimens available. Regimens by fibrosis stage and genotype are selected based on the most recent treatment guidelines of the American Association for the Study of Liver Diseases (AASLD).²⁷ When multiple regimens are recommended for a genotype or fibrosis stage, the average efficacy is calculated and used. Treatment costs for genotype 1 are based on the 12-week DAA cost estimate of \$100,000 (2012 USD) cited by Leidner et al.²⁸ This estimate is inflated to 2015 dollars and adjusted for treatment duration.²⁸ For genotype 2, we assume a treatment duration of 16 weeks, and for genotype 3, we assume a duration of 24 weeks. Regimen drugs, duration, efficacy, and costs differ by infection genotype, as detailed in **Table A3**.

The treatments used in all scenarios include drugs that are currently protected under patent, but that have seen price competition from recent market entrants. To account for these pricing dynamics, the model reduces treatment costs by 46%²⁹ in years 2-20 to account for branded competition.³⁰

Table A3. Regimens, Duration, and Efficacy

Drugs used						
Genotype 1	LED/SOF for 12 weeks (F0-F3) or 24 weeks (F4) ABT-450/r for 12 weeks (F0-F3) or 24 weeks (F4 only) SOF/SIM with or without RBV for 12 weeks (F0-F3) or 24 weeks (F4)					
Genotype 2	No cirrhosis: SOF and RBV for 12 weeks Cirrhosis: SOF and RBV for 16 weeks					
Genotype 3	SOF plus RBV for 24 weeks (no IFN used)					
Treatment costs						
	<i>Year 1²⁸</i>			<i>Years 2+²⁸</i>		
Genotype 1	\$103,799			\$56,051		
Genotype 2	F0-F2: \$103,799 F3-HCC: \$138,398			F0-F2: \$56,051 F3-HCC: \$74,735		
Genotype 3	\$207,598			\$112,103		
Efficacy						
	F0-F2		F3		F4, DC, HCC	
	<i>Other Adult^a & PWID</i>	<i>MSM-HIV</i>	<i>Other Adult^a & PWID</i>	<i>MSM-HIV</i>	<i>Other Adult^a & PWID</i>	<i>MSM-HIV</i>
Genotype 1	F0: 0.98 F1-F2: 0.97	0.96	0.97	0.96	F4: 0.93 DC-HCC: 0.82	F4: 0.91 DC-HCC: 0.82
Genotype 2	0.97	0.88	0.97	0.88	0.97	0.88
Genotype 3	0.91	0.67	0.91	0.67	0.68	0.67

ABT-450/r refers to paritaprevir with ritonavir; LED/SOF, ledipasvir and sofosbuvir combination, SOF/SIM, sofosbuvir and simeprevir combination; SOF plus RBV is sofosbuvir plus ribavirin; DC indicates decompensated cirrhosis; F0-F4, METAVIR fibrosis stages (F4 is most severe); HCC, hepatocellular carcinoma; HIV, human immunodeficiency virus; IFN, interferon; ; MSM-HIV, HIV-positive men who have sex with men; PWID, people who inject drugs.

^aOther Adults, US residents born before 1992 who are not members of the PWID or MSM-HIV groups.

2.1. Treatment Policies

The scenarios involve treating a fixed proportion of the prevalent population in *each* model cycle. Once treated in the first model cycle, many of the currently diagnosed patients are cured and removed from the prevalent population, yet in subsequent model cycles, the same proportion of the remaining prevalent patients are treated. Thus, aggressive treatment scenarios implicitly assume that prevalent patients continue to be diagnosed at the same constant rate and that the same proportion of diagnosed patients is available for treatment.

We evaluate treatment policies and the spillover impact on Medicare by comparing 2 alternative scenarios with a status quo scenario. The status quo scenario reflects current access to treatment and AASDL guidelines for “highest priority for treatment” and assumes that all insurance types provide treatment for fibrosis stages F3 and F4. We assume the uninsured population does not receive treatment.

We consider 2 alternative scenarios. The first assumes that private payers expand treatment from the status quo to include the population in fibrosis stages F2-F4. The second alternative scenario assumes private payers expand treatment to the population in fibrosis stages F0-F4. We compute the impacts of this increased private-payer generosity on Medicare as the differences in outcomes between the alternative scenarios and the status quo for the population in Medicare.

2.2. Model Outputs

The model outputs the number of people, treatment costs, medical expenditures (nontreatment costs) in each year, disease-treatment state, risk group, genotype, and insurance-status category. We use these outputs to compute changes in costs to Medicare in the 2 alternative scenarios relative to status quo, described above.

To obtain the social value of treatment under the alternative scenarios relative to the status quo, we multiply the number of people in each disease state, risk group, genotype, and insurance-status group by published estimates of annual per-person values for quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs). Each QALY is valued at \$150,000 to generate the total value of QALYs produced by a treatment scenario.³¹ Other annual per-person estimates of economic measures, including treatment costs and medical expenditures, are similarly applied to disease-state populations to generate population-wide estimates. Dollar values are discounted at 3% per year to produce present discounted values of future value streams.³²

Patients who die within a cycle are assumed to transition out of the simulation following a uniform probability distribution with a mean of 6 months. Model outputs for such patients are calculated as half the values as for those who do not die during the cycle.

3. Model Parameter Estimates

Model parameters are taken from the published literature, with efforts made to find risk-group and genotype-specific values wherever possible. The Other Adult risk group represents the largest number of HCV-infected patients, and is defined as US residents born before 1992 who are not members of the PWID or MSM-HIV groups. Model parameters for the Other Adult risk group and their sources are provided in **Table A4**.

The PWID risk group has the highest incidence rate, reflecting the greatest transmission among the 3 risk groups. The PWID cohort also has the highest starting mortality rates for both the infected and uninfected populations.³³ Model parameters for the PWID cohort and their sources are provided in **Table A5**.

The MSM-HIV risk group is composed of HIV-positive men who have sex with men. This co-infection affects the progression of HCV.³⁴ Model parameters for the MSM-HIV risk group and their sources are provided in **Table A6**.

Table A4. Model Parameters for “Other Adult”^a Risk Group by Genotypes 1-3 and Disease States^b

Disease State	HCV Genotype		
	Genotype 1	Genotype 2	Genotype 3
Annual Mortality Rate^c			
Susceptible (background)		0.042 ³⁵	
Acute, F0-F2	0.0834 ³⁶	0.0709 ^{19,36}	0.0776 ^{19,36}
F3, F4	0.2390 ^{19,36}	0.2032 ^{19,36}	0.2223 ^{19,36}
DC	0.1350 ³⁷⁻³⁹	0.1148 ^{19,37-39}	0.1256 ^{19,37-39}
HCC	0.4270 ^{37,40,41}	0.3630 ^{19,37,40,41}	0.3971 ^{19,37,40,41}
Transplant ^d		0.1650 ⁴²	
Post transplant ^e		0.1249 ^{19,35}	
Annual Transition Probability			
Acute → spontaneous clearance		0.18 ²⁰	
F0 → F1		0.076 ⁴³⁻⁴⁵	
F1 → F2		0.095 ⁴³⁻⁴⁵	
F2 → F3		0.108 ⁴³⁻⁴⁵	
F3 → F4		0.134 ⁴³⁻⁴⁵	
F3 → HCC	0.008 ^{37,46}	0.008 ^{37,46}	0.0144 ^{17,37,46}
F4 → DC	0.039 ^{37,38,47}	0.0265 ^{17,37,47}	0.0507 ^{17,37,47}
F4 → HCC	0.025 ^{37,38}	0.0138 ^{17,37,38}	0.045 ^{17,37,38}
DC → HCC	0.025 ^{37,38}	0.0138 ^{17,37,38}	0.045 ^{17,37,38}
DC → transplant		0.031 ^{48,49}	
HCC → transplant		0.103 ^{47,48}	
F3 cure → F4 cure		0.0375 ²⁴	
F3 cure → HCC cure		0.0029 ²⁴	
F4 cure → DC cure		0.0109 ²⁴	
F4 cure → HCC cure		0.009 ²⁴	
DC cure → HCC cure		0.007 ²⁴	
QALY Weights			
Susceptible, acute		0.86 ^{48,50}	
Acute, F0-F1		0.79 ^{49,50}	
F2, F3, F3 cure		0.79 ^{49,50}	
F4, F4 cure		0.76 ^{48,51}	
DC, DC cure		0.69 ^{48,51}	
DC transplant ^d		0.50 ^{48,51}	
DC post transplant ^e		0.71 ^{26,52}	
HCC, HCC cure		0.67 ^{48,51}	
HCC transplant ^d		0.50 ^{48,51}	
HCC post transplant ^e		0.71 ^{26,52}	

Annual Medical Expenditures ^f	
Susceptible	\$6984 ⁵³
Acute, F0, F1, F2, F3	\$16,904 ⁵⁴
F0 fail, F1 fail, F2 fail, F3 fail, F3 cure	\$10,988 ^{54,55}
F4	\$20,052 ⁵⁴
F4 fail, F4 cure	\$15,239 ^{54,55}
DC	\$56,020 ⁵⁴
DC fail, DC cure	\$39,214 ^{54,55}
DC transplant ^d	\$161,108 ⁵⁴
DC post transplant ^e	\$161,108 ⁵⁴
HCC	\$124,229 ⁵⁴
HCC fail, HCC cure	\$86,961 ^{54,55}
HCC transplant ^d	\$161,108 ⁵⁴
HCC post transplant ^e	\$161,108 ⁵⁴

DC indicates decompensated cirrhosis; F0-F4, METAVIR fibrosis stages (F4 is most severe); HCC, hepatocellular carcinoma; QALY, quality-adjusted life-year.

^aOther Adults, US residents born before 1992 who are not members of the groups of people who use intravenous drugs or men infected with HIV who have sex with other men.

^bThe table reports the average mortality.

^cModel relies on mortality rates by 1-year age group, as reported by the National Vital Statistics Report and adjusted for risk.¹⁴

^dYear of liver transplant.

^eAll subsequent years after liver transplant.

^fAll medical expenditures are inflated to 2015 dollars.

Table A5. Model Parameters for PWID Risk Group by Genotypes 1-3 and Disease States^a

Disease State	HCV Genotype		
	Genotype 1	Genotype 2	Genotype 3
Annual Mortality Rate^b			
Susceptible		0.0161 ³³	
Acute, F0-F2	0.2520 ^{33,36}	0.2142 ^{19,33,36}	0.2344 ^{19,33,36}
F3, F4	0.4481 ^{19,33,36}	0.3809 ^{19,33,36}	0.4167 ^{19,33,36}
DC	0.1350 ³⁷⁻³⁹	0.1148 ^{19,37-39}	0.1256 ^{19,37-39}
HCC	0.4270 ³⁷⁻³⁹	0.3630 ^{19,37-39}	0.3971 ^{19,37-39}
Transplant ^c		0.1650 ⁴²	
Post transplant ^d		0.3169 ^{19,33}	
Annual Transition Probability			
Acute → spontaneous clearance		0.18 ⁵⁶	
F0 → F1		0.116 ^{43,57-62}	
F1 → F2		0.085 ^{43,57-62}	
F2 → F3		0.085 ^{43,57-62}	
F3 → F4		0.13 ^{43,57-62}	
F3 → HCC	0.008 ^{37,46}	0.008 ^{37,46}	0.0144 ^{17,37,46}
F4 → DC	0.039 ^{37,38,47}	0.0265 ^{17,37,47}	0.0507 ^{17,37,47}
F4 → HCC	0.025 ^{37,38,47}	0.0138 ^{17,37,38}	0.045 ^{17,37,38}
DC → HCC	0.025 ^{37,38,47}	0.0138 ^{17,37,38}	0.045 ^{17,37,38}
DC → transplant		0.031 ^{48,49}	
HCC → transplant		0.103 ^{47,48}	
F3 cure → F4 cure		0.0364 ²⁴	
F3 cure → HCC cure		0.0029 ²⁴	
F4 cure → DC cure		0.0109 ²⁴	
F4 cure → HCC cure		0.009 ²⁴	
DC cure → HCC cure		0.007 ²⁴	
QALY weights	Same as for Other Adult ^e risk group. See Table A4 for values.		
Annual medical expenditures^f	Same across risk groups and genotype. See Table A4 for values.		

DC indicates decompensated cirrhosis; F0-F4, METAVIR fibrosis stages (F4 is most severe); HCC, hepatocellular carcinoma; PWID, people who inject drugs; QALY, quality-adjusted life-year.

^aThe table reports the average mortality.

^bModel relies on mortality rates by 1-year age group, as reported by the National Vital Statistics Report and adjusted for risk.¹⁴

^cYear of liver transplant.

^dAll subsequent years after liver transplant.

^eOther Adults, US residents born before 1992 who are not members of the groups PWID or men infected with the HIV who have sex with other men.

^fAll medical expenditures inflated to 2015 dollars.

Table A6. Model Parameters for MSM-HIV Risk Group by Genotypes 1-3 and Disease States^a

Disease State	HCV Genotype		
	Genotype 1	Genotype 2	Genotype 3
Annual Mortality Rate^b			
Susceptible		0.0860 ⁶³	
Acute, F0-F2	0.1821 ^{36,63}	0.1548 ^{19,36,63}	0.1693 ^{19,36,63}
F3, F4	0.3716 ^{19,36,63}	0.3158 ^{19,36,63}	0.3456 ^{19,36,63}
DC	0.1350 ³⁷⁻³⁹	0.1148 ^{19,37-39}	0.1256 ^{19,37-39}
HCC	0.4270 ³⁷⁻³⁹	0.3630 ^{19,37-39}	0.3971 ^{19,37-39}
Transplant ^c		0.1650 ^{64,65}	
Post transplant ^d		0.2459 ^{64,65}	
Annual Transition Probability			
Acute → spontaneous clearance		0.130 ²¹	
F0 → F1		0.122 ³⁴	
F1 → F2		0.115 ³⁴	
F2 → F3		0.124 ³⁴	
F3 → F4		0.115 ³⁴	
F3 → HCC	0.016 ^{26,37,46,66}	0.016 ^{26,37,46,66}	0.0288 ^{17,37,46,66}
F4 → DC	0.078 ^{26,37,38,47,67}	0.053 ^{17,37,38,47,67}	0.1014 ^{37,38,47,67}
F4 → HCC	0.050 ^{26,37,38,66}	0.0275 ^{17,37,38,66}	0.0900 ^{37,38,66}
DC → HCC	0.050 ^{26,37,38,66}	0.0275 ^{17,37,38}	0.0900 ^{37,38}
DC → transplant		0 ²⁶	
HCC → transplant		0 ²⁶	
F3 cure → F4 cure		0.0322 ²⁴	
F3 cure → HCC cure		0.0058 ²⁴	
F4 cure → DC cure		0.0218 ²⁴	
F4 cure → HCC cure		0.018 ²⁴	
DC cure → HCC cure		0.014 ²⁴	

QALY Weights	
Susceptible	0.87 ^{25,64}
Acute, F0-F1	0.81 ^{25,49,64}
F2, F3, F3 cure	0.80 ^{25,49,64}
F4, F4 cure	0.68 ^{25,64}
DC, DC cure	0.48 ^{25,64}
DC transplant ^c	0.81 ^{25,64}
DC post transplant ^d	0.81 ^{25,64}
HCC, HCC cure	0.23 ^{25,64}
HCC transplant ^c	0.81 ^{25,64}
HCC post transplant ^d	0.81 ^{25,64}

Medical expenditures^e Same across risk groups and genotype. See Table A4 for values.

DC indicates decompensated cirrhosis; F0-F4, METAVIR fibrosis stages (F4 is most severe); HCC, hepatocellular carcinoma; HIV, human immunodeficiency virus; MSM-HIV, HIV-positive men who have sex with other men; QALY, quality-adjusted life-year.

^aThe table reports the average mortality.

^bModel relies on mortality rates by 1-year age group, as reported by the National Vital Statistics Report and adjusted for risk.¹⁴

^cYear of liver transplant.

^dAll subsequent years after liver transplant.

^eAll medical expenditures are inflated to 2015 dollars.

3.1. Starting Populations

At model start, the size of the total infected population across all disease stages is 3,640,847.⁶⁸ This includes 22,304 incident patients,⁶⁹ who are distributed across the 3 risk groups according to estimates from Williams et al,¹¹ and within each risk group across 3 genotypes according to the prevalence of each genotype in the overall population, as estimated by Manos et al (2012).¹⁵ These incident patients make up the populations in the acute phases at the start of the simulation. The remaining 3,618,543 non-incident infected population at model start are distributed across risk groups and genotypes following the same logic. These patients are then further distributed across chronic disease stages as in Hagan (2014).^{10,43,70} The distribution of the infected population by risk group, genotype, and disease stage is given in **Table A7**.

Table A7. Size and Distribution of Model Populations at Start of Simulation^a

		Other Adult	PWID	MSM-HIV
Uninfected/Susceptible		197,404,127 ³⁵	2,242,594 ⁷¹	461,600 ⁷²
Genotype 1	<i>Acute</i>	0	14,514	1545
	<i>F0</i>	271,199	155,186	16,524
	<i>F1</i>	558,352	319,501	34,020
	<i>F2</i>	350,964	200,829	21,384
	<i>F3</i>	223,341	127,801	13,608
	<i>F4</i>	95,717	54,772	5832
	<i>DC</i>	47,859	27,386	2916
	<i>HCC</i>	47,859	27,386	2916
Genotype 2	<i>Acute</i>	0	3225	343
	<i>F0</i>	60,267	34,486	3672
	<i>F1</i>	124,078	71,000	7560
	<i>F2</i>	77,992	44,629	4752
	<i>F3</i>	49,631	28,400	3024
	<i>F4</i>	21,271	12,171	1296
	<i>DC</i>	10,635	6086	648
	<i>HCC</i>	10,635	6086	648
Genotype 3	<i>Acute</i>	0	2419	258
	<i>F0</i>	45,200	25,864	2754
	<i>F1</i>	93,059	53,250	5670
	<i>F2</i>	58,494	33,471	3564
	<i>F3</i>	37,223	21,300	2268
	<i>F4</i>	15,953	9129	972
	<i>DC</i>	7976	4564	486
	<i>HCC</i>	7976	4564	486

DC indicates decompensated cirrhosis; F0-F4, METAVIR fibrosis stages (F4 is most severe); HCC, hepatocellular carcinoma; HIV, human immunodeficiency virus; MSM-HIV, HIV-positive men who have sex with other men; Other Adults, US residents born before 1992 who are not members of the PWID or MSM-HIV groups; PWID, people who inject drugs.

^aWe computed the initial insurance status distributions for each risk group based on self-reported insurance status from National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES).

Source: Authors' analysis⁶⁸ and CDC (2014)⁷³; Manos (2012)¹⁵; Williams (2011)¹¹; and Hagan (2014).⁷⁰

Table A8 reports the distribution of insurance status by risk group.

Table A8. Starting Distribution of Insurance Type by Risk Group

Insurance Status	Risk Group		
	Other Adult ^a	PWID	MSM-HIV
Private Insurance	106,437,282 53.32%	1,419,979 40.45%	255,941 42.86%
Medicare	39,444,874 19.76%	262,933 7.49%	100,229 16.83%
Medicaid ^b	16,388,786 8.21%	456,359 13.00%	152,730 25.56%
Uninsured	37,348,866 18.71%	1,371,184 39.06%	87,700 14.74%
Total	199,619,808	3,510,456	596,600

HIV, human immunodeficiency virus; MSM-HIV, HIV-positive men who have sex with other men; PWID, people who inject drugs.

^aOther Adults, US residents born before 1992 who are not members of the PWID or MSM-HIV groups.

^bThe Medicaid group includes the population covered under other local and state programs designed for low-income, disabled, or disadvantaged individuals.

Source: NHANES 2003-2012.

3.2. Annual Mortality Rates

To appropriately account for mortality risk by risk group, age, genotype, and disease state, we estimate mortality rates that account for differential risks using the multiplicative model,

$$M(a, r, g, s) = M_0(a)R_r R_g R_s \quad (3)$$

where $M_0(a)$ is the US base annual mortality rate,¹⁴ for a person at age a , and R_r , R_g , R_s are proportionality constants that account for a person's risk group, HCV genotype, and stage of liver disease, respectively. We derive the proportionality constants R_r , R_g , R_s based on estimates from the literature and given in **Table A9**, below.

Table A9. Mortality Adjustment Factors by Disease State and Genotype

Disease State	Mortality Factor R_s	Viral Genotype	Mortality Factor R_g
Uninfected	1.000	Genotype 1	1.000
Acute, F0-F2	2.370	Genotype 2	0.850
F3, F4 ^a	8.935	Genotype 3	0.930
Post transplant and cured states	3.770		

F0-F4, METAVIR fibrosis stages (F4 is most severe).

^aF3-F4 is a multiple of the F2 factor, so the total is 2.370 (El-Kamary et al, 2011) x 3.770 (McCombs et al, 2012) = 8.935.^{19,36} F3, F4, decompensated cirrhosis, hepatocellular carcinoma, and cured are 3.770 times base mortality.

We assume the proportionality constant for the Other Adult group, R_r , is 1.0. For the PWID group we rely on Mathers et al (2013), which provides a systematic review of the mortality of intravenous drug users.³³ The paper provides a mortality rate ratio (standardized mortality ratio) of 11.19 in North America (see page 109, Figure 3). This means that the death rates of PWIDs are approximately 11.9 times that of the US base annual mortality rate after adjusting for age; however, directly using the 11.9 estimate overcounts mortality in this group because some of the excess mortality among PWID is attributable to HCV infection and thus is already accounted for by our other proportionality constants in the model in equation 3 (namely R_s and R_g). Thus, we need to parse out the effect of risk group that is independent from the effects of HCV infection. Specifically, R_r represents the age-adjusted mortality rate ratio for HCV *uninfected* PWIDs compared with the general population. To estimate R_r , we expressed the mortality rate for the PWIDs at age a [called $M(a,r)$ in the equation below] as a weighted average of the mortality rates for HCV-infected PWIDs (stratified by genotype and disease stage) and uninfected PWIDs:

$$M(a,r) = P(I) \sum_{g,s} P(g,s)M(a,r,g,s) + P(NI)M(a,r,NI) \quad (4)$$

where $P(I)$ is the initial proportion infected in the PWID risk group, $P(NI) = 1 - P(I)$ is the proportion uninfected, and $P(g,s)$ is the proportion of the infected persons who are infected with genotype g and are in stage s . Dividing the above equation by the baseline mortality rate for a person in the United States at age a , we obtain,

$$\frac{M(a,r)}{M_0(a)} = 11.19 = P(I) \sum_{g,s} R_r R_g R_s P(g,s) + P(NI)R_r \quad (5)$$

Van Nuys et al (2015) give estimates of $P(g,s)$, $P(I)$, and $P(NI) = 1 - P(I)$, and using the values of R_g and R_s given above we solved equation 5 for R_r to get $R_r = 4.15$.⁷⁴ This implies that the mortality rate for HCV-uninfected PWIDs is approximately 4.15 times that of the baseline rate in the United States (accounting for age).

We used a similar approach for the MSM-HIV group using the mortality rate ratios for HIV-infected men (Karch et al, 2015), which estimates that HIV-infected men have about 3.4 times the mortality rate of the baseline mortality in the United States.⁷⁵ The 3.4 figure accounts for excess mortality from HCV infection, and thus (as explained above) also needs to be adjusted downward so as not to double-count the effects of HCV on mortality. We used the above equation (5) replacing 11.19 with 3.4 and using the input values for $P(g,s)$ and $P(I)$ for the MSM-HIV group from Van Nuys et al (2015) and obtained $R_r = 2.04$ for the MSM-HIV group.⁷⁴

These adjustment factors are applied to age-based base mortality rates based on 2010 Census data.¹⁴ The age-based base mortality rates reported by HHS are adjusted using the multiplicative mortality model described above to account for disease state, genotype, and risk group.

4. Additional Results

4.1. Results for 10-year time horizon

We report results at the 5- and 20-year horizon in the main text. Results for our primary simulation at the 10 year horizon are presented in **Table A10**.

Table A10. Change in Costs when Private Payers Expand Treatment Coverage (10-year horizon)^a

	Treat F2-F4		Treat F0-F4	
	Cost Effect on Private Insurers	Cost Effect on Medicare “Spillovers”	Cost Effect on Private Insurers	Cost Effect on Medicare “Spillovers”
	<i>10-year horizon</i>			
Change in medical expenditures (\$B)	-\$21.59	-\$0.20	-\$38.83	-\$2.53
Change in HCV treatment costs (\$B)	\$35.04	-\$0.04	\$63.13	-\$0.13
Change in total costs (\$B)	\$13.45	-\$0.25	\$24.30	-\$2.66
Change in total costs per capita	\$2184	-\$73.68	\$4105	-\$449

B indicates billions (US dollars); F0-F4, METAVIR fibrosis stages (F4 is most severe); HCV indicates hepatitis C virus.

^aCosts are changes that result from expanding from the baseline scenarios (“Treat F3-F4”) and are reported in 2015 US dollars. Future costs are discounted at a rate of 3% per year. Per capita costs are calculated as total cost per HCV-positive Medicare beneficiary.

4.2. Sensitivity Analyses

We conducted sensitivity analyses to test the effect of several key assumptions on our results.

First, we tested the sensitivity of results to varying the economic value of a QALY. A wide range of values are used, so we varied our value from a low of \$50,000/QALY to a high of \$300,000/QALY to reflect the range of values seen in the literature (see **Table A11**).

Table A11. Sensitivity Analysis: QALY Values^a

	Private Insurance Expansion from Baseline (F3-F4) to F2-F4			Private Insurance Expansion from Baseline (F3-F4) to F0-F4		
	Assumed Value of a QALY			Assumed Value of a QALY		
	50K	150K	300K	50K	150K	300K
	<i>5-year horizon</i>					
Total QALYs	\$3.0	\$8.9	\$17.8	\$9.1	\$27.2	\$54.4
Cumulative net value	-\$22.2	-\$16.3	-\$7.4	-\$68.3	-\$50.2	-\$23.0
	<i>20-year horizon</i>					
Total QALYs	\$116.9	\$350.6	\$701.3	\$176.4	\$529.1	\$1058.3
Cumulative net value	\$133.7	\$367.5	\$718.1	\$206.3	\$559.1	\$1088.2

F0-F4 indicates the METAVIR fibrosis stages (F4 is most severe); QALY, quality-adjusted life-year.

^aTotal QALYs and net value are in billions (2015 US dollars).

Next, we examined the effects of varied treatment costs on our results. We varied treatment cost in each year by 50% to simulate low-cost (-50%) and high-cost (+50%) scenarios. Results are presented in **Table A12**.

Table A12. Sensitivity Analysis: Treatment Costs over 20-year horizon^a

	Private Insurance Expansion from Baseline (F3-F4) to F2-F4		Private Insurance Expansion from Baseline (F3-F4) to Treat F0-F4	
	Effect on Private Insurers	Effect on Medicare ("Spillovers")	Effect on Private Insurers	Effect on Medicare ("Spillovers")
Low Treatment Costs				
Medical expenditures	-\$44.3	-\$3.0	-\$104.4	-\$9.0
HCV treatment costs	\$27.6	-\$1.4	\$73.1	-\$1.9
Total costs	-\$16.7	-\$4.3	-\$31.3	-\$11.0
Per-capita total costs ^b	-\$1622.6	-\$421.3	-\$3210.2	-\$1125.7
High Treatment Costs				
Medical expenditures	-\$44.3	-\$3.0	-\$104.4	-\$9.0
HCV treatment costs	\$51.0	\$2.1	\$135.2	-\$3.0
Total costs	\$6.7	-\$5.1	\$30.8	-\$12.1
Per-capita total costs ^a	\$646.6	-\$494.9	\$3156.4	-\$1238.3

F0-F4 indicates METAVIR fibrosis stages (F4 is most severe); HCV, hepatitis C virus.

^aMedical expenditures, HCV treatment costs, and total costs are in billions (2015 US dollars).

^bPer-capita costs are calculated as total cost per HCV-positive Medicare beneficiary.

Finally, we test the effect of simultaneous expansion of treatment by both Medicaid and private payers on Medicare, as opposed to holding Medicaid’s treatment policy constant (see **Table A13**).

Table A13. Alternative Simulation: Impact of Simultaneous Private and Medicaid Expansion over a 20-year horizon^a

	Private and Medicaid Expansion from Baseline (F3-F4) to F2-F4		Private and Medicaid Expansion from Baseline (F3-F4) to F0-F4	
	Effect on Private Insurers	Effect on Medicare (“Spillovers”)	Effect on Private Insurers	Effect on Medicare (“Spillovers”)
Medical expenditures	-\$44.6	-\$3.5	-\$105.0	-\$10.4
HCV treatment costs	\$34.0	-\$1.6	-\$89.9	-\$2.3
Total costs	-\$10.6	-\$5.1	-\$15.1	-\$12.8
Per-capita total costs ^b	-\$1036.7	-\$496.0	-\$1568.8	-\$1328.3

F0-F4 indicates METAVIR fibrosis stages (F4 is most severe); HCV, hepatitis C virus.

^aMedical expenditures, HCV treatment costs, and total costs are in billions (2015 US dollars).

^bPer-capita costs are calculated as total cost per HCV-positive Medicare beneficiary.

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